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The social market economy and restriction of free movement rights: plus c’est la même chose? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Case law restricting free movement rights is criticized for privileging the internal market over social 
rights, achieved through reductive ‘binary’ reasoning that focuses too narrowly on the ‘free movement 
versus social rights’ dimension of the conflict. The problem is typically discussed for the economic 
freedoms but is evident elsewhere in free movement law too. This point is demonstrated through the 
example of EU citizenship and social assistance, which establishes that protecting national public 
finances justifies free movement restrictions when citizens are not seen as market participants. For better 
integration of economic, social and constitutional objectives, judicial assessments have progressed in 
some respects beyond the binary conflict method, evidencing the beginnings of the more complex 
accommodation of multiple dimensions that a system of multilevel constitutionalism requires. However, 
these advances have not yet produced significantly different outcomes in practice. The legacy of binary 
conflict reasoning proves stubbornly resilient to change.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Brüstle, Advocate General Bot observed that ‘the Union is not only a market to be regulated, 
but also has values to be expressed’.1 The array of values on which the EU is founded and to 
which it subscribes has been clarified and expanded in each instance of Treaty revision. 
Moreover, in defining the EU internal market as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’, Article 26(2) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) also requires that this task must be done ‘in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaties’.  
 
Article 7 TFEU articulates the overarching process idea in its statement that ‘[t]he Union shall 
ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account 
and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers’. More specifically for present 
purposes, codification of the Union’s ambition to ‘work for…a highly competitive social market 
economy’ (Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)), added by the Lisbon Treaty, 
exemplifies an integrated conception of market and non-market goals for EU law and 
policymaking. This idea of the social market economy reflecting but also arguably requiring 
the integration of market objectives and social objectives – rather than conceiving them as 
‘contradictory pairs’ (Polomarkakis, 2017, p424) – informs the analysis that follows. 
 
The controversial judgments in Viking Line and Laval provide the archetypal example of the 
‘contradictory pairs’ approach in the sense of concerns about social dumping and the posting 
of workers being subsumed by freedom of establishment and the free provision of services  
protected by EU internal market law (Syrpis and Novitz, 2008).2 On one view, the Treaty itself 
sets up a reductively binary – i.e. market v social – framing of these disputes by requiring that 
restrictions of free movement – even where such restrictions aim to protect fundamental social 
rights – must be defended i.e. shown to be justifiable in principle and proportionate (Barnard, 
2008). The economic freedom protected by the Treaty acquires not just legal but also normative 
priority as a result. The conventional premises of the economic constitution then prevail i.e. 
                                                          
1 AG Bot in Case C-34/10 Brüstle (EU:C:2011:138), para. 46 of the Opinion.  
2 Case C-438/05 Viking Line, EU:C:2007:772 and Case C-341/05 Laval, EU:C:2007:80. 
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economic freedoms as defining principles in the aim of integrating distinct national markets 
into an internal market; supported by an autonomous constitutional framework characterized 
by the principles of direct effect and primacy. Moreover, within that template, the Court of 
Justice necessarily retains command over a wide interpretative space.  
 
It should also be remembered that the EU Treaties do not tend to provide guidance about how 
different policies and objectives committed to should be reconciled with each other, or whether 
and how they might be prioritized, when they end up in conflict in a given situation. Taking 
all Union objectives into account is one thing in the abstract; but how can it be given practical 
effect when concrete disagreements must be resolved? The fact that relevant Treaty 
amendments have never adjusted the restriction/defence structure of provisions conferring free 
movement rights adds to the confusion. The greater emphasis on competition enforcement and 
on the social dimension of the market that the ambition of a highly competitive social market 
economy aims to advance does not, in other words, change the EU’s basic constitutional 
mechanisms in and of itself. Without more deliberate resetting – on the Court’s own initiative 
as well as in the Treaties – it is difficult to see how ‘the EU system[‘s] accumulated internal 
asymmetries between market integration at supranational level and social protection at 
national level, which generate frictions and are a source of disenchantment and hostility 
towards market opening’ (Monti, 2010, p68) can be better addressed.  
 
Normative balancing is not, however, the only relevant conflict vector in these cases. At the 
time of writing, a revised framework for the posting of workers (European Commission, 2016) 
is working its way through the EU’s legislative procedures. This process highlights another 
significant dimension of the market/social conflict i.e. questions about respective 
Union/Member State(s) competences. The Union has limited capacity to act in the field of social 
protection 3  and the Member States have chosen diverse social models. Indeed, the 
Commission’s plans for reform of EU legislation on posted workers were initially halted by 
national parliaments triggering the Lisbon Treaty’s subsidiarity mechanism (European 
Commission, 2016b). EU citizenship case law on free movement restrictions provides another 
example of the competence dimension of market/social conflicts, in the sense of an inherently 
Union status necessarily challenging national regulatory discretion. Such challenges are 
particularly sensitive when the Union citizenship claim impacts on national public finances, 
leading the Court to articulate more forcefully a framework for free movement rights that 
seems to privilege, once again, the protection of market participants over the protection of the 
socially vulnerable. However, as will be seen, conflict questions about Union/national 
competence – and institutional balance – were vital in this case law too. 
 
This paper aims, first, to highlight the multiplicity of challenges and conflicts at issue in cases 
where the restriction of free movement rights intersects with the protection of social rights. 
Treaty amendments have amplified social concerns at a substantive level but, at the same time, 
have not altered the free movement provisions at the heart of EU internal market law. Second, 
the paper asks more specifically whether the social market economy concept can or should 
make a difference in terms of enabling greater recognition of social interests when free 
movement restrictions require to be defended. It is argued that the concept does have legal 
potential in this respect and shown that the Court of Justice has recently adjusted its methods 
of reasoning to some extent to reflect the more integrated nature of the post-Lisbon legal 
environment. However, it is also suggested that the embedded imprint of binary reasoning is 
                                                          
3 See Articles 148-161 TFEU; and note, in particular, the limitations in Articles 151 and 153. 
See further, European Commission, 2017. 
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difficult to overcome, showing that more radical options for change have not gained traction 
in judicial practice.  
 
Section 2 first outlines how the Court of Justice has gradually demarcated greater space for 
national discretion in judgments about entitlement to social assistance in a host Member State. 
This case law reflects the relatively thin, and increasingly contested, membrane of transnational 
solidarity that underpins the extent to which citizens who are not economically active – i.e. 
citizens who are not, for the purposes of EU law, perceived as market participants – should be 
supported beyond the borders of their own State. This example demonstrates that the 
‘contradictory pairs’, market-centered analysis critiqued in the Viking Line and Laval case law 
pervades free movement adjudication beyond classic disputes engaging the economic 
freedoms. However, while citizenship conflicts can be reduced to contradictory pairs – ‘market 
v social’ or ‘citizen v State’ or ‘court v legislator’ or ‘Union v State’ – the crucial point is that the 
case law is, in reality, about all of these things and about all of them at once. 
 
If reducing situations characterized by multiple tensions to binary conflicts risks subduing the 
more complex reality, are different legal approaches possible? Are they, more than this, required 
in a system predicated on concepts of constitutionalism?4 These questions are looked at in 
Section 3, which examines, in the context of defending free movement restrictions, the Court’s 
first explicit comments on the social market economy concept in AGET Iraklis.5 If this judgment 
changed anything, it relates to more comprehensive articulation of the different interests at 
stake in market/social conflicts and more open recognition of constitutional questions around 
Union/national competence. It will be seen that there was no dramatic legal revolution. 
However, more detailed exposition of underlying conflicts is not without value on its own 
terms. In particular, it may provoke deeper engagement, and responsibility, by a wider range 
of stakeholders in progressing what the applicable law should actually aim to achieve.  
 
 
2. Separating market, social and constitutional objectives: social protection and EU 
citizenship law 
 
In free movement law, the right to move and reside conferred on EU citizens by Article 21 
TFEU is not discussed by the Court of Justice when one of the economic freedoms applies on 
the facts of the case.6 On one view, this means that the free movement rights exercised under 
Article 21 TFEU are different from rights exercised by, for example, workers or service 
providers. However, Article 26 TFEU refers more broadly to the free movement of persons in 
defining the EU internal market. The Court confirms the interconnectedness of citizenship 
rights and economic rights in its ‘specific expression’ reasoning; for example, that ‘Article [21 
TFEU], which sets out generally the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, finds specific expression in Article [45 TFEU] 
in relation to the freedom of movement for workers’.7 The market-centered rather than social-
centered ‘contradictory pair’ analysis criticized with respect to economic freedom case law is 
just as evident in citizenship case law when restrictions on free movement rights must be 
                                                          
4 For present purposes, the Court of Justice’s understanding of the constitutional features of 
the EU legal order is applied: see esp. Case 26/62 van Gend & Loos, EU:C:1963:1, Case 294/83 
Les Verts v Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, Case C-405/02 P Kadi v Council and Commission, 
EU:C:2008:461, Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454. 
5 Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, EU:C:2016:972. 
6 E.g. Case C-583/14 Nagy, EU:C:2015:737, paras 19-25. 
7 Case C-293/03 My, EU:C:2004:821, para. 33. 
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defended. More specifically, citizenship law extends equal access to social benefits only to 
citizens who are market participants through being employed, self-employed or otherwise 
financially self-sufficient (thereby excluding, for example, citizens looking for work). 
 
Normative propositions debated in scholarship on EU citizenship law are frequently in tension 
with one another. In particular, market citizenship and free movement paradigms remain 
vulnerable to the criticism that they sustain an incomplete understanding of the EU citizen as 
an instrumental unit of free movement that progresses, above all, the establishment of the 
internal market. From that perspective, linking the legal protection of the person inherently or 
predominantly to market logic fails to recognise, protect or advance the status of citizenship in 
a sufficiently human, person-driven sense. As a result, the shallowness of EU citizenship in 
practice frustrates the realisation of its deeper potential as an ethical as much as legal construct. 
The market participant institutes the citizen as a person reduced (O’Brien, 2013, 2016; 
Kochenov, 2017). 
 
Another thread of the debate examines the inherent limits of EU competence vis-à-vis the 
capacity of the Member States, represented by the conditions in Article 20(1) TFEU that EU 
citizenship, first, is accessible only through the holding of Member State nationality and, 
second, ‘shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship’. A related disagreement 
concerns the respective authority of the EU legislator and the EU judiciary to lead on the 
authorship of EU citizenship law. Here, the terms of Articles 20 and 21 TFEU – which explicitly 
authorise the EU legislator to attach conditions and limits to the exercise of citizenship rights8 
– call into question the legitimacy of case law in which the progression of citizenship rights 
overrides legislative constraints (Hailbronner, 2005, Sorensen, 2011; Dougan, 2013). That 
analysis engages with questions about institutional balance and the democratic credentials of 
the different institutional actors, especially at EU but also at national level (Davies, 2016a). A 
more complete picture of complexity emerges only by bringing these strands together: the 
tension between EU citizenship as an inherently supranational status that is nevertheless 
inherently tied to national regulatory oversight, with sometimes differing institutional visions 
about the substance of associated rights.  
 
In corners of citizenship case law, a judicial creativity that advances the rights of the citizen, 
and thereby EU citizenship itself, is (still) evident.9 However, for citizens who have moved yet 
are not economically active or financially self-sufficient in the host State, and whatever critical 
reaction this case law provokes from a normative perspective, judgments in recent years have 
focused more straightforwardly on respecting the conditions and limits expressed in secondary 
                                                          
8 In contrast to how derogations from the economic freedoms are explicitly restricted to 
public policy, public security and public health concerns (see e.g. Article 45(3) TFEU on the 
free movement of workers). 
9 E.g. drawing from Article 20 TFEU directly to protect the ‘substance’ of EU citizenship 
rights in exceptional circumstances (and without requiring any cross-border movement), 
Case C-135/08 Rottmann, EU:C:2010:104; Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, EU:C:2011:124; Case C-
165/14 Rendón Marín, EU:C:2016:675. 
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legislation. 10  In particular, the Court has less ambiguously than before 11  emphasised the 
requirements for lawful residence in a host State set down in Article 7 of Directive 2004/38 i.e. 
being economically active (as a worker or self-employed person); or otherwise, possessing 
comprehensive medical insurance and sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the 
social assistance system of the host State.  
 
Conversely, EU citizens who are not lawfully resident in a host State in accordance with Article 
7 are not protected by EU legal guarantees of equal treatment with that State’s nationals. This 
finding has had particular consequences for entitlement to social assistance12 as well as other 
social benefits.13 Citizens who are economically active – who are market participants –  are, in 
contrast, entitled to full equal treatment: 14 in such circumstances, even ‘[t]he fact that the 
income from employment is lower than the minimum required for subsistence does not 
prevent the person in such employment from being regarded as a “worker” within the meaning 
of Article [45 TFEU]…even if the person in question seeks to supplement that remuneration by 
other means of subsistence such as financial assistance drawn from the public funds of the State 
in which he resides’.15  
 
Constraints on access to social assistance for EU citizens do qualify as restrictions of free 
movement but restrictions that are, in the view of the Court, defensible. In this respect, the 
protection of national public finances has gained greater traction as a legitimate public interest 
defence. At a general level, the Court insists that ‘aims of a purely economic nature cannot 
constitute an overriding reason in the general interest justifying a restriction of a fundamental 
freedom guaranteed by the Treaty’. 16 Given that the internal market seeks to break down 
national barriers, there is a counter-protectionist logic behind that stance. In parallel, however, 
it is accepted that ‘none the less…interests of an economic nature’ 17 can provide a legitimate 
defence to free movement restrictions. This line of reasoning was first developed in case law 
on access to medical services,18 and later applied to other sensitive sectors of public spending 
                                                          
10 E.g. applying (strictly) the sufficient financial resources conditions in Articles 7 and 24 of 
Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 2004 OJ L158/77, Case C-333/13 
Dano, EU:C:2014:2358 ; Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, EU:C:2015: 597. A subtheme of this case law 
concerns the shift to more systemic and presumptive approaches to proportionality analysis, 
which contrasts with earlier cases exhibiting preference for case by case assessment of 
individual circumstances (e.g. Case C-413/99 Baumbast, EU:C:2002:49; Case C-140/12 Brey, 
EU:C:2013:565). For analysis, see Šadl and Rask Madsen, 2016. 
11 E.g. Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala, EU:C:1998:217; Case C-456/02 Trojani, EU:C:2004:488. 
12 E.g. Case C-333/13 Dano. 
13 E.g. Case C-308/14 Commission v UK, EU:C :2016:436. 
14 See Article 7(2) of Regulation 492/2011/EU on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Union, 2011 OJ L141/1 and e.g. Case C-213/05 Geven, EU:C:2007:438, para. 12 (emphasis 
added). 
15 Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze, EU:C:2009:344, para. 28, 
confirming e.g. Case 53/81 Levin, EU:C:1982:105. 
16 Case C-35/98 Verkooijen, EU:C:2000:294, para. 48. 
17 Case C-141/07 Commission v Germany, EU:C:2008:492, para. 60 (emphasis added). 
18 E.g. Case C-158/96 Kohll, EU:C:1998:171, para. 50; Case C-368/98 Vanbraekel, EU:C:2001:400, 
para. 47; Case C-372/04 Watts, EU:C:2006:325, paras 103-104; Case C-173/09 Elchinov, 
EU:C:2010:581, para. 42. 
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such as education19 and social security.20 In many of these cases, the public interest defence 
submitted is arguably not of a purely economic nature. But the line between acceptable 
‘economic nature’ defence and unacceptable ‘purely economic’ defence is difficult to draw.21 
Holding it enables the retention of strong rhetoric against national economic protectionism at 
one level while, at the same time, providing a route through which arguments connected to 
public spending concerns can at least be heard (Arrowsmith, 2015; Snell, 2016; Oliver, 2017). 
 
Against that background, it may seem surprising that in citizenship case law more specifically 
– the less market-driven manifestation of free movement rights in theory –  the Court has 
accepted in a blunter way that ‘the exercise of the right of residence for citizens of the Union 
can be subordinated to the legitimate interests of the Member States – [to] the protection of 
their public finances’.22 Initially, although the Court did acknowledge the protection of public 
finances as a legitimate concern of the Member States, it rationalized proportionate citizen 
claims against that concern by ruling that ‘beneficiaries of the right of residence must not 
become an unreasonable burden on the public finances of the host Member State. [EU legislation] 
(…) thus accepts a certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals of a host Member State 
and nationals of other Member States, particularly if the difficulties which a beneficiary of the 
right of residence encounters are temporary’.23  
 
In subsequent case law, prioritization of national financial interests became more evident. In 
Bidar, the Court ruled that ‘although the Member States must, in the organisation and 
application of their social assistance systems, show a certain degree of financial solidarity with 
nationals of other Member States (…) it is permissible for a Member State to ensure that the 
grant of assistance to cover the maintenance costs of students from other Member States does 
not become an unreasonable burden which could have consequences for the overall level of 
assistance which may be granted by that State’.24 With this phrasing, the Court recognises not 
just the claim of the individual citizen in a given case; but also potential implications for public 
spending in a more aggregate sense. That concern was later embedded directly in how the 
Court defines ‘social assistance’ i.e. benefits ‘to which recourse may be had by an individual 
who does not have resources sufficient to meet his own basic needs and those of his family and 
who by reason of that fact may, during his period of residence, become a burden on the public 
finances of the host Member State which could have consequences for the overall level of 
assistance which may be granted by that State’.25  
 
As noted above, there has also been a shift in the proportionality dimension of the case law 
from requiring national authorities to assess a claimant citizen’s individual circumstances to 
accepting that citizens who do not satisfy the criteria for lawful residence in Article 7 can be 
excluded from entitlement to certain benefits as a class.26 The implications for a State’s overall 
financial balance were given decisive weight through the Court’s acknowledging that ‘the 
assistance awarded to a single applicant can scarcely be described as an “unreasonable burden” 
for a Member State’; but accepting that ‘while an individual claim might not place the Member 
                                                          
19 E.g. Joined Cases C-11/06 and 12/06 Morgan and Bucher, EU:C:2007:626, para 36. 
20 E.g. Joined Cases C-396/05, C-419/05 and C-450/05 Habelt, Möser and Wachter, para. 83. 
21 E.g. Case C-20/12 Giersch, EU:C:2013:411, paras 47-56. 
22 Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 55. 
23 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para. 44 (emphasis added). 
24 Case C-209/03 Bidar, EU:C:2005:169, para. 56. 
25 Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 61. 
26 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, paras 59-63; Case C-308/14 Commission v UK, para. 80. 
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State concerned under an unreasonable burden, the accumulation of all the individual claims 
which would be submitted to it would be bound to do so’.27 
 
Positive responses to these developments align mainly with the institutional perspective 
outlined earlier i.e. preferring greater judicial appreciation of and respect for the limits and 
conditions enacted in legislation. However, there has also been discomfort with and critique of 
the resulting exacerbation of citizenship’s exclusionary character – questioned already around 
an individual’s capacity to move in the first place in order to be able to benefit from the market-
linked rights of EU citizenship; but more starkly when considered as a manifestation of social 
exclusion. The legal narrative on EU citizenship and social assistance thus demonstrates that 
while relevant binary conflicts – ‘citizen v market’, ‘citizen v State’, ‘State v Union’, etc. – can 
be identified and isolated, the range of actors, interests and tensions at play in a concrete 
dispute suggests more complicated, aggregate dynamics.  
 
More particularly, recent case law has tried to resolve an escalating conflict between the Union 
value of free movement within the internal market and national public spending forbearance. 
But this focus has pulled the debate away from the social protection of the citizen. The 
simplifying impulse towards binary categorization of the relationships and tensions that are 
constantly being negotiated by the economic constitution is understandable at one level. But it 
poorly accommodates the more complex balancing of multiple interests that the system of EU 
constitutionalism craves. The particular danger for present purposes is that we sideline the 
dimensions that are harder to resolve or more controversial to air. In that light, recent case law 
does not address whether it is congruent with EU citizenship, as the ‘fundamental status’ of 
Member State nationals, to overlook or at least not to articulate the responsibilities of the host 
State – or indeed of the home State – for EU citizens who are demonstrably in need yet who do 
not have legitimate claims to social assistance under applicable EU legislation.28  
 
Any expected role that the Charter might play in this context has also failed, at least to date, to 
be realized. Article 6(1) TEU establishes that the Treaties and the Charter have ‘the same legal 
value’. However, first, the Court has been reluctant to assess restrictions of free movement 
rights in the case law against the social rights and social protections provided for in the 
Charter.29 Second, while the right to move and reside conferred by EU citizenship is itself a 
fundamental right protected by Article 45 of the Charter, Article 52(2) of the Charter provides 
that ‘[r]ights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be 
exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties’ (emphasis added), a 
limitation on the potentially autonomous impact of the Charter that the Court has thus far 
confirmed and respected.30 
 
The result of all of this is that social protection has not been sustained under EU citizenship 
law for those who have moved yet are considered not to be participating adequately in the 
                                                          
27 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 62. 
28 For discussion of ‘citizens in tolerated, but not supported, in-between situations’ as a result, 
see Nic Shuibhne, 2015, pp932-934; characterized as a ‘starve them out’ strategy by Thym, 
2015, p260; addressed as an ‘outsider class…which is socially challenging and morally 
questionable’ in Davies, 2016b, p5. However, cf. recently in the UK, R. (on the application of 
Gureckis) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWHC 3298; in this High Court 
judgment, administrative policy on the removal of rough sleepers was found to be 
incompatible with EU free movement law.  
29 See esp. Case C-333/13 Dano, paras 85-91. 
30 E.g. Case C-390/12 Pfleger, EU:C:2014:281, para. 60. 
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internal market. The case law provides a reminder that the act of free movement may be 
transnational by definition, but competence for social policy remains in substance with the 
Member States. The binary approach taken by the Court aims primarily to alleviate 
Union/national conflict; but then omits consideration of other conflicts, such as the 
market/social balance between economic responsibility and protection of vulnerable citizens. 
The underlying message is that national finances pay for social rights that will be extended to 
nationals of the State in question and to EU citizens who are market participants there. More 
socially vulnerable EU citizens are not protected; and neither is their fate even raised for 
judicial discussion.  
 
The same compression of underlying interests is seen in Viking Line and Laval. In his 2010 
Report for the European Commission, capturing both the wave of criticism directed at that case 
law and the stronger social impetus injected into the EU Treaties by the Lisbon amendments, 
Monti observed that the case law ‘revived an old split that had never been healed: the divide 
between advocates of greater market integration and those who feel that the call for economic 
freedoms and for breaking up regulatory barriers is code for dismantling social rights protected 
at national level’ (Monti, 2010, p68). That may be true, but it is not (just) that EU market 
objectives clash only with national social protection standards. First, different Member States 
have different social protection standards, and these will clash with each other. Second, as the 
Court’s recognition of an EU-level fundamental right to take collective action in Viking Line and 
Laval demonstrates, EU social protection standards exist too – but they may be different from 
national standards in a given dispute. Neither of these points found adequate reflection in the 
binary reasoning style of the relevant judgments  
 
In her contribution to this special issue, Gerbrandy recalls that a central purpose of the 
economic constitution is to protect individual economic freedom against both market-power 
and state-power. She concludes that ‘[c]ompetition law seems to have lost the link with a 
“humane” market and with the “social” sphere in which it functions. It has only a very tenuous 
connection with the notion of solidarity. [A] more fine-tuned approach is called for, because 
the risk of a disconnect from supporting a free society looms’ (Gerbrandy, 2018, pTBC). The 
same thoughts could be applied in connection with the EU citizenship and social assistance 
example outlined here. At one level, detecting similar ‘disconnects’ in two very different EU 
regulatory spaces is suggestive of a wider systemic imbalance.  
 
However, the case law on citizenship and social assistance arguably meets with stronger 
approval on other metrics: it evidences greater engagement with and respect for national 
priorities in a large and diverse Union; and greater judicial respect for legislative choices,  
attracting deeper democratic credentials. Ultimately, then, the question is: what legal principles 
should transcend the more fluid dynamics of policymaking? What constitutional values should 
limit the choices of both national and EU actors, and guide how these choices are translated 
into law? How can we protect the beings as well as the States, remembering the Van Gen den 
Loos promise of the EU as a ‘new legal order…the subjects of which comprise not only the 
Member States but also their nationals’? How can the market and the social be integrated more 
meaningfully in the sense suggested by Article 3(3) TEU, but integrated also with the 
competence and institutional questions generated by multilevel constitutional governance? 
 
 
3. Integrating market, social and constitutional objectives: evidence of a new legal approach? 
 
It has been observed that ‘[i]n practice, EU internal market law is most frequently used in order 
to challenge national (social) policy’ (Schiek et al, 2015, p27) – as a public interest defence of 
 9 
national choices. Thus, while social protection is of course an EU objective on its own terms 
(Barnard and de Baere, 2014), the sharper end of the market/social legal debate has concerned 
cases where national social protection levels are questioned as constituting a limitation on or 
obstacle to fuller EU market participation.  
 
In Viking Line and Laval, the Court worked through the stages of assessment applied as 
standard in free movement disputes i.e. first, determination of whether or not national rules 
were a restriction of free movement rights; second, consideration of justification and 
proportionality (Reynolds, 2016). An alternative legal approach was inferred by Advocate 
General Poiares Maduro in Viking Line, when he suggested that ‘[n]either the Treaty rules on 
freedom of movement, nor the right to associate and the right to strike are absolute. Moreover, 
nothing in the Treaty suggests that the [Union]’s social policy objectives must always take 
precedence over the objective of having a properly functioning common market. On the 
contrary, the inclusion of both policy objectives in the Treaty signifies the aim of the [Union] to 
bring these policies together’.31 This conciliation method – attributing equality of status for 
economic freedoms and social rights – does reflect the ‘same legal value’ given to the Charter 
and the Treaties by Article 6(1) TEU. Similarly, Advocate General Trstenjak suggested that 
‘general equality in status implies, first, that, in the interests of fundamental rights, 
fundamental freedoms may be restricted. However, second, it implies also that the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms may justify a restriction on fundamental rights’.32 But how would an 
equal status approach work in practice? Norms of equal status are still in conflict with each 
other in a concrete dispute, which needs to be resolved. The limitation in Article 52(2) of the 
Charter, which actually accords priority to the Treaty in free movement disputes, was also 
noted in Section 2. 
 
A second alternative approach goes further by suggesting explicit alterations to the Court’s 
standard legal method. Moreover, Treaty change provides the relevant legal foundations. In 
that respect, Monti argued that ‘the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which explicitly sets 
out the social market economy as an objective for the Union and makes the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights legally binding at Treaty level…should shape a new legal context’ 
(Monti, 2010, p69). In Santos Palhota, Advocate General Cruz Villalón argued that this new legal 
context could displace the conventional rule that exceptions from free movement rights must 
always be interpreted strictly. In his view:  
 
In so far as the protection of workers is a matter which warrants protection under the 
Treaties themselves, it is not a simple derogation from a freedom, still less an unwritten 
exception inferred from case-law. To the extent that the new primary law framework 
provides for a mandatory high level of social protection, it authorises the Member 
States, for the purpose of safeguarding a certain level of social protection, to restrict a 
freedom, and to do so without European Union law’s regarding it as something 
exceptional and, therefore, as warranting a strict interpretation. That view, which is 
founded on the new provisions of the Treaties cited above, is expressed in practical 
terms by applying the principle of proportionality.33 
 
                                                          
31 AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-438/05 Viking Line (EU:C:2007:292), para. 23 of the Opinion. 
Monti described it as ‘conciliation between economic freedoms in the single market and 
workers’ rights’ (Monti, 2010, p8). 
32 AG Trstenjak in Case C-577/10 Commission v Germany (EU:C:2012:477), para. 81 of the 
Opinion. 
33 AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota (EU:C:2010:245), para. 53 of the Opinion. 
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Recourse to an adapted proportionality test reorients the proposal as less of a legal revolution 
than it might first have seemed (Nic Shuibhne, 2010; Barnard, 2012), though this would of 
course depend on the extent of the adaptation. However, the scale of mindset change involved 
in rethinking the respective scope of rights/restrictions – a principle of legal interpretation of 
established and widespread application – should not be underestimated.  
 
A third option is more radical still: moving beyond equal status for market freedoms and social 
rights so that the latter prevail. Barnard and de Baere outline the problem through the lens of 
the posted workers case law: ‘[t]he moment collective action was found to be a “restriction” 
and thus in breach of EU law, the “social” interests were on the back-foot, having to defend 
themselves from the economic rights of free movement…So, despite recognition of the right to 
strike for the first time in these cases, the limitations on the exercise of that right laid down by 
EU law subsume much of the right’ (Barnard and de Baere, 2014, p12). Under a reverse priority 
model, the Court would instead ‘ask (which it has never done so far) whether the restriction of 
collective labour rights in the name of economic freedoms can be justified. This is the only way 
to safeguard the mutual optimisation of collective labour rights and economic freedoms instead 
of prioritising economic freedoms…The Court would then have to ask whether there is a less 
restrictive method to safeguard the employers’ right to provide services across a border’ 
(Schiek et al, 2015, p89; see also, p79: ‘the purpose of human rights protection is to provide a 
meta-layer of rights, which enjoy priority over other law. This demands priority of the 
[Charter] over Internal Market law’). 
 
The Court’s response to the ‘new legal context’ generated by the Lisbon Treaty seems more 
modestly to align to date with the conciliation method i.e. the first ‘equality of status’ 
alternative outlined above. It does mark an advance from previous case law in that it progresses 
the evaluation beyond purely binary market/social reasoning, which, as argued in this paper, 
compresses the multiplicity of actors and of substantive interests involved in EU-related 
disputes. It is typically referred to as the ‘fair balance’ method i.e. ‘[w]here several rights and 
fundamental freedoms protected by the European Union legal order are at issue, the 
assessment of the possible disproportionate nature of a provision of European Union law must 
be carried out with a view to reconciling the requirements of the protection of those different 
rights and freedoms and a fair balance between them’.34  
 
Two notes of caution should be sounded, however. First, this method is not actually new at all. 
In particular, it pre-exists the new legal context that was apparently constituted by the Lisbon 
Treaty.35 What could be said to have changed is its more prevalent, more explicit use. But 
second, the Court still attributes methodological force to the ‘architectural imbalance [that] 
exists in the adjudication of conflicts between free movement and fundamental rights’ 
(Reynolds, 2016, p674). For example, in Erny, the Court ruled, post-Lisbon, that ‘although it is 
apparent, in particular from [Article 152(1) TFEU], that the European Union respects the 
autonomy of the social partners, the fact none the less remains, as is stated in Article 28 of the 
Charter ... that the right of workers and employers, or their respective organisations, to 
negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels must be exercised in 
accordance with European Union law’36 – in that case, more specifically, in accordance with Article 
45 TFEU and the requirements of freedom of movement for workers. Thus, even where the 
Court uses the language of fair balance, the deep roots of free movement law logic establish 
                                                          
34 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich, EU:C:2013:28, para. 60. Discussing the difference between 
conciliation and balancing as judicial methods, see Davies, 2016c, pp223-224. 
35 See esp. Case C-112/00 Schmidberger, EU:C:2003:333, paras 81-82. 
36 Case C-172/11 Erny, EU:C:2012:399, para. 50 (emphasis added).  
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more of a hierarchy, a set of parameters that inform and constrain the outcome of the ‘fair 
balance’ of relevant interests in reality.  
 
However, in its judgment in AGET Iraklis, delivered in December 2016, the Court referenced 
the social market economy concept for the first time – all the more striking when contrasted 
with the opening lines of Advocate General Wahl’s Opinion in the same case. He introduced 
the EU as being ‘based on a free market economy, which implies that undertakings must have the 
freedom to conduct their business as they see fit’.37 The dispute concerned the compatibility of 
conditions in Greek law applied to an authorization procedure for collective redundancies with 
freedom of establishment under EU internal market law. In particular, national administrative 
authorities authorizing collective redundancies were required to take into account conditions 
in the national labour market and the interests of the national economy. The crisis-driven 
priorities of the national regulatory context are inescapable. 
 
First, the Court found that such a scheme constituted a restriction on freedom of establishment 
under Article 49 TFEU. This is not the place to comment at length on the breadth of restrictions 
on free movement law, a question of some debate (Antonaki, 2017, pp1522-1525). But it must 
be observed that this very breadth is itself a significant part of the market dominance problem. 
If virtually every (non-discriminatory) national regulatory choice is conceived as an 
impediment to the operation of the EU market, that is already a market/non-market value 
judgement that then necessitates EU-level review of national policy decisions. How the 
authorization process challenged in AGET Iraklis amounts to a ‘serious obstacle’ to freedom of 
establishment is not self-evident.38  
 
However, second, when considering justification of the legislation in light of overriding 
reasons in the public interest, the Court invoked not the ‘free market economy’ characterisation 
of the Advocate General but, instead, Article 3(3) TEU, to proclaim: ‘the European Union is not 
only to establish an internal market but is also to work for the sustainable development of 
Europe, which is based, in particular, on a highly competitive social market economy aiming 
at full employment and social progress, and it is to promote, inter alia, social protection’.39 It 
continued that ‘the European Union thus has not only an economic but also a social purpose’ 
and that, therefore, free movement rights ‘must be balanced against the objectives pursued by 
social policy’.40 The judgment thus articulated the range of values protected by the Treaty, 
including the social values embedded there. Importantly, it also gave weight to a Treaty-
mandated space designated for addressing national social concerns, engaging with the 
competence dimension of the case. 
 
The Court reaffirmed the distinction noted in Section 2 between public interest arguments 
based on ‘purely’ economic grounds (not acceptable) and measures taken (in this case) for ‘the 
encouragement of employment and recruitment which, being designed in particular to reduce 
                                                          
37 AG Wahl in Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis (EU:C:2016:429), para. 1 of the Opinion (emphasis 
added); for analysis, Antonaki, 2017; and Polomarkakis, 2017. 
38 AGET Iraklis, para. 57. The Court found that the legislation at issue ‘render[ed] access to the 
Greek market less attractive and, following access to that market, to reduce considerably, or even 
eliminate, the ability of economic operators from other Member States who have chosen to set 
up in a new market to adjust subsequently their activity in that market or to give it up, by parting, 
to that end, with the workers previously taken on’ (AGET Iraklis, para. 56; emphasis added). 
39 Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, para. 76. 
40 AGET Iraklis, para. 77. In this respect, the Court referred to Articles 151, 147(2) and 9 TFEU. 
See further, Schiek, 2017, pp634-638. 
 12 
unemployment, [constitute] a legitimate aim of social policy’. 41 It therefore ruled that ‘the 
criterion of “interests of the national economy” to which th[e] legislation refers cannot be 
accepted. Indeed, a prohibition on effecting collective redundancies which is dictated, in 
particular, by the wish to prevent an economic sector, and consequently the country’s economy, 
from suffering the adverse effects that they cause must be regarded as pursuing an economic 
aim, which…cannot constitute a reason in the public interest that justifies a restriction on a 
fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty’.42  
 
That statement invokes a fundamental yet elusive concern of internal market law; what Snell 
describes as ‘the purest of economic reasons—protectionism’ (Snell, 2016, p120). Snell 
acknowledges the central role that countering protectionism plays in EU internal market law 
yet argues that the absence of a definition of or reference to the concept in the Court’s case law 
is then problematic (Snell, 2016, p128). Davies has argued that ‘policy decisions about how the 
economy should be organised are not just about protectionism, and trade, and efficiency, and 
wealth, but also about social bonds and the quality of life. These are legitimate, even essential, 
concerns to take into account, and to put into the policy balance, if a regulator wishes to 
improve the well-being of the regulated’ (Davies, 2016c, pp219-220). The judgment in AGET 
Iraklis does reflect this contention in many respects.  
 
However, the contested national measure failed the necessity dimension of the proportionality 
test since the applicable conditions were considered to have been set out too generally and 
imprecisely.43 We are in a sense, then, back at square one. We do find greater articulation of the 
range of complex interests at play in disputes too quickly shorthanded as market/social 
conflicts. And there is more conscious effort to apply a conciliation or ‘fair balance’ method in 
the Court’s case law, which aims to convey a sense of equal status of applicable norms as befits 
a complex polity framed by constitutional legal boundaries. But is there any substantial 
change? Does the achievement of the internal market remain (too) pivotal in the legal 
consciousness of the Union and its institutions, even though the primary legal (Treaty) texts do 
not demand this after Lisbon? Here, Azoulai’s analysis captures perfectly both the progress – 
that there has been more of a ‘connection’ between the social and market and ‘between the 
different national and sectoral elements of the situations’ of conflict – and the lack of progress 
– but not yet the ‘necessary correction in view of the distortions of power that are at stake in 
such contexts’ – that the case law now presents (Azoulai, 2008, p1355).  
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
The EU Treaties are awash with a spread of commitments to what we term non-market values, 
in contrast to how the logic of economic constitutionalism once considered the market to be 
distant or at least apart from these other values in a constitutive sense. Furthermore, the 
structural features, such as competence limitations, that inform different parts of the EU 
Treaties and underpin the permitted reach of EU policymaking define the context in which the 
substantive objectives of the Treaties play out. As a legal constraint, that is as it should be. And 
just as the economic constitution must involve constitutionalism, the social market economy is 
still a market.  
                                                          
41 AGET Iraklis, para. 74. The Court also analysed the national scheme for compatibility with 
Article 16 of the Charter (see paras 62-70, 82-94 and 103 of the judgment). 
42 AGET Iraklis, paras 96-97. 
43 AGET Iraklis, paras 98-103. 
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However, the social market economy concept arguably requires greater recognition and 
pursuit of the integrated character of the market and the non-market spheres – of the idea that 
social values are market values too. But how can the social market economy as a common 
purpose agreed to by the Member States produce a more meaningful legal difference when 
conceptions of its very social dimension are enduringly diverse and contested – this fact itself 
mandated by the structural principles of the EU constitution? Three conclusions on that critical 
question are offered here. 
 
First, alternative legal approaches have been suggested with a view to achieving reorientation 
away from the dominance of free movement rights. However, the radical upheaval that their 
putting into practice would impose on the integrity of the wider EU legal framework is a stark 
disincentive to their realization. For example, why should social protection – as distinct from 
many other good objectives protected by EU primary law – reverse the deeply rooted and 
widely applied interpretative principle that exceptions from rights should be construed 
narrowly, as advocated under the second legal approach summarised above? Why not 
environmental protection too? Similarly, why should gender discrimination not also trigger 
the more profound reversal suggested by the third alternative approach, which would 
privilege fundamental rights expressed in the Charter above other objectives protected by the 
EU Treaties, overriding the ‘same legal status’ proviso in Article 6(1) TEU? Pushing imbalances 
towards the other extreme merely changes, not addresses, the existence of an imbalance in the 
first place. If radical changes to the system of EU (free movement) law are merited, further 
Treaty change should spell them out very plainly.  
 
For those who would prefer to break apart the established system of free movement law to give 
effect to more radical alternatives, AGET Ikaklis will feel like another disappointment in a long 
line of disappointments. However, second, while it is just one judgment, there is interesting 
potential in the justification part. Antonaki rightly emphasises the ‘in principle’ dimension of 
the Court’s reasoning – its confirmation of and recourse to the social market economy ambition 
makes it clear that less general and more precise conditions could save legislation that 
constrains freedom of establishment in order to meet social objectives that are important and 
conditioned by circumstances applicable at national level (Antonaki, 2017, p1522).44 That in 
itself marks a change from Viking Line and Laval. Shaping the legislative reform aftermath of 
those decisions, States, beings and institutions, at national and EU levels, are working more 
effectively together to figure out how and to what extent the social dimension of an integrated 
internal market can be made real (Schiek, 2017, 640). 
 
Furthermore, at a time in which the denigration of expertise and even basic facts has come to 
shape our interrogation of EU functions and purposes, 45 we should not underestimate the 
substantive value of clarity and of the evidently greater space given to explaining the decision 
seen in AGET Iraklis. In the example of citizenship case law on access to social assistance, the 
impoverished consequences of applying a binary approach to complex challenges were 
discussed. The value of acknowledging the range of actors involved and the range of interests 
at stake should not be dismissed. It makes the Court’s eventual choices clearer and easier to 
                                                          
44 See similarly, Polomarkakis, 2017, p433, arguing that the judgment could be read as a signal 
that the Court ‘not only…tolerate[s], but…accept[s], at least as a theoretical possibility, that 
measures enacted to achieve [social] aims shall not constitute infringements of the 
fundamental freedoms’, in direct response to Article 3(3) TEU as an element of the ‘EU’s 
constitutional reality’.  
45 For powerful discussion of the implications of this in the context of Brexit, see Dougan, 
2017, pp6-11. 
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evaluate against the requirements of the Treaties. It reflects rather than represses the 
complexity of disputes that arise in a mature economic, social and constitutional order. 
 
Finally, third, we should remember that the role and reach of ‘the market’ in society at large 
produce some of the most challenging, frustrating, serious and daunting questions of our times. 
To think that the EU is either particularly at fault or particularly equipped to deal alone with 
their resolution asks far too much of the EU – and far too little of the rest of us.  
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